This Week: Explaining Afghanistan

"Quote" of the Week

Militarizing the "Truth"

"The Inevitability and Rightness" of U.S. "Success" in Afghanistan

"The Morality of it Has to Be Explained Better"

Greetings,

I've been talking about the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan for a few issues now, and here's why: As real and urgent as is the suffering in Afghanistan itself, it is also—along with Iraq—a symbol and a test case for the U.S. role in the world in the 21st Century. There are choices to be made as to how the U.S. manages its decline from The World's Only Superpower to a more modest role.

This week I talk about the "narrative" that we use to explain all of this. For the most part, leaders of the Empire have been allowed to define the story, telling us how well they are "succeeding" and—most crucially—defining the very meaning of "success." This propaganda work is going on all over the place, on many different levels, but I think it is easiest to see in the case of Afghanistan. So I intend this little series of articles as a mini-case study in how and why information is used to "obtain support" for the massive violence needed to maintain an unjust world order. Let it serve as a sort of inoculation for Nygaard Notes readers against what I have called Delusion Disease, a disease that keeps us from seeing the world as it is.

In solidarity,

Nygaard

"Quote" of the Week

94 Percent of People in Kandahar Favor Negotiations Over Fighting

This week's "Quote" is from the New York Times of April 21st, in a page six article headlined, "Assassination in Kandahar Further Erodes Afghans' Faith in the Government." It's hard to pick a single quotation from this mind-bending article, but how about this one:

"In a recent survey, Kandaharis favored negotiations with the Taliban by a margin of 19 to 1 over continued fighting. Five of six Kandaharis viewed the Taliban as ‘our Afghan brothers,' while four of five also said most members of the Taliban would stop fighting if given jobs."

The Times here refers to a March survey taken by the U.S. Army. Specifically, by the U.S. Army's social science program, the Human Terrain System. Even after taking into consideration the fact that Afghans were responding to a survey conducted by an occupying army (it's not clear to me that respondents were told who was running the survey), Afghans told the poll-takers that it is "better to negotiate with the Taliban" than to "continue fighting"—94 percent said this. 85 percent said that "The Taliban are our Afghan brothers." And 81 percent said that "Most Taliban would stop fighting if given jobs."

Meanwhile, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tells us not only that the U.S. will "continue fighting," but he says specifically that "Kandahar will be next" to be attacked by NATO forces. The New York Times reported on April 26th that "elite units" are already operating in Kandahar, and that "the battle for Kandahar has become the make-or-break offensive of the eight-and-half-year war."

Nygaard's comment on the "make-or-break offensive": Too late. It's already broken.

Militarizing the "Truth"

The U.S. government has always had a large propaganda bureaucracy, but it is being increasingly militarized, with information operations migrating from the civilian parts of the government into the hands of the Pentagon.

On February 5, 2009, the Associated Press published the results of a yearlong investigation that attempted to "tally the money spent [by the Pentagon] to inform, educate and influence the public in the U.S. and abroad." That's rather polite language, but the report itself was not so polite, as it detailed "the Pentagon's rapidly expanding media empire, which is now bigger in size, money and power than many media companies."

I cited this AP report a few issues ago in NN #450 ("A Close-up View of Propaganda"). I pointed out then that "over the past five years, the money the military spends on winning hearts and minds at home and abroad has grown by 63 percent, to at least $4.7 billion this year." In an indication of the degree to which the propaganda functions of the government have been taken over by the military establishment, the AP notes that "This year, the Pentagon will employ 27,000 people just for recruitment, advertising and public relations—almost as many as the total 30,000-person work force in the State Department."

In the world of the military, the overall job of controlling information is known as "Information Operations," or "IO." When the Pentagon talks in public about their IO in the South Asia war zone, they say that the U.S. military's point is to "get its message out to the people of Pakistan and the surrounding region." Lt. Col. Shawn Stroud, who until May 2009 served as director of strategic communication at U.S. Army Combined Arms Center in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, says that the point of IO is to "be first with the truth."

The implication of such statements is that the "message" the U.S. is trying to get out is a message of "truth." But that message itself is not entirely true, as we see when we look at some documents on the subject that were produced for internal consumption by the U.S. military. For example, let's have a look at the Army's Information Operations Field Manual of 2003 [FM 3-13 (FM 100-6)], which says that "Information is an element of combat power. Commanders conduct information operations (IO) to apply it." The Army here is talking about information as used in actual battle, where "information superiority" is achieved when our side knows what is going on at all times and "the adversary" does not.

In another Field Manual—the "Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual" of 2006 [FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5]—the concept of IO is broadened, and in this Manual the Army leadership tells its people that "Information operations (IO) must be aggressively employed to accomplish the following:

* "Favorably influence perceptions of HN [Host Nation] legitimacy and capabilities.

* "Obtain local, regional, and international support for COIN [Counterinsurgency] operations.

* "Publicize insurgent violence.

* "Discredit insurgent propaganda and provide a more compelling alternative to the insurgent
ideology and narrative."

The objectives spelled out in these manuals are consistent not with a promotion of "truth," but rather with a desire to prevail in what has been called a "propaganda war" in South Asia which, as TIME Magazine put it last year, "the Taliban is winning." In the Pentagon's quest to "Obtain ... support for COIN operations," what we see is that information becomes simply another tool, and the value of "truth" is measured by its usefulness in "influencing perceptions." Put more bluntly, if the "truth" is seen to undermine support for the occupation, then truth must, and will, be sacrificed.

And here is where we get to the essence of the Deep Propaganda that explains the entire criminal enterprise in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and wherever U.S. leaders decide that they must carry on the dirty work of policing the globe. Let's have a look at that essence.

"The Inevitability and Rightness" of U.S. "Success" in Afghanistan

What I call Propaganda has two levels, which I refer to as "Overt" and "Deep." Overt Propaganda is the specific thing that the propagandist is asking us to believe, while Deep Propaganda is what makes that thing believable. While Overt Propaganda tends to be specific and conscious, Deep Propaganda is usually general and unconscious. Deep Propaganda is found deep within each of us in the form of the assumptions, premises, and unwritten foundations upon which many stories and news reports rest.

In terms of the corporate media, we can say that the specific facts of a specific news story are the Overt Propaganda, and the larger story into which these facts fit is the Deep Propaganda. I've been talking about the military operation in Marja, Afghanistan that was conducted in February by (mostly) U.S. troops. That offers a good example of how the two levels of Propaganda look in practice.

Recall that I mentioned news reports which often sounded like this one from the Los Angeles Times: "U.S. and Afghan commanders reported only scattered resistance from Taliban fighters." Let's say these reports were true. What is the larger story that gives meaning to these reports? The story preferred by the U.S. is that the Taliban are cowardly, or weak, or overwhelmed, or for whatever reason are "on the run." Thus the London Telegraph could report that the Marja operation "has been declared a success." As I pointed out, another story exists, which is the story of an indigenous resistance to occupation, one that utilizes guerrilla tactics. Seen through that lens the "scattered resistance" looks like a strategic retreat, one which denies the occupation forces any good shots at the targets of their offensive while allowing the resistance to survive and fight another day. In this story it is the guerrillas who can "declare a success." So we see that the same facts can be used to support very different stories.

Controlling the Narrative

Another word for "story" is narrative, and U.S. military propagandists speak quite freely (amongst themselves) about their desire to control the narrative that informs media reports. Recall the 2006 Counterinsurgency [COIN] Field Manual I mentioned in the previous article. In that manual "narrative" is defined as follows: "A narrative is an organizational scheme expressed in story form," and is "The central mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed..."

On page 193 of that manual we find a section titled, "EXPLOIT A SINGLE NARRATIVE," which gives some helpful hints as to how to do so:

"Higher headquarters usually establishes the COIN narrative," says the Manual, adding that, once it's established, "Company-level leaders apply the narrative gradually. They get to know local opinion makers, win their trust, and learn what motivates them. Then they build on this knowledge to find a single narrative that emphasizes the inevitability and rightness of the COIN operation's success. This is art, not science." (I beg to differ on that last point. This is pretty straightforward Public Relations theory, which I consider a science.)

While there may be a "single narrative" set by "higher headquarters," that's not the end of it. There are different versions of the narrative that explain what it is, exactly, that is "inevitable and right" about "the COIN operation," and the decision as to which one to invoke will depend on the target audience. There are basically three targets for occupation propaganda: The people in the United States; the people in U.S.-allied nations; and the people who are the subjects of the COIN operation, the Afghan people.

The U.S. audience is the audience whose support is most crucial for the continuation of the Global War on Terror (or whatever we're calling it these days). The Pentagon budget for "public affairs," which is what they call information aimed at U.S. audiences, comes to something like $547 million per year. For this audience the narrative that will best make the U.S. occupation seem "inevitable and right" is a narrative of self-defense against those who "threaten America and our allies," in Obama's words. The narrative that is aimed at the home audience thus emphasizes "U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan," and focuses on "our core goal—to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually destroy extremists and their safe havens within [Afghanistan and Pakistan]," in the words of the White House's "Interagency Policy Group on U.S. Strategy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan."

The second narrative about U.S. activities in Afghanistan is the one aimed at people in nations that are allied with the U.S. The Pentagon spends at least $489 million per year to "disseminate information to large foreign audiences through mass media," in what are known as "psychological operations," or PsyOp. The purpose is "to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals."

Members of the "coalition" in Afghanistan are mostly NATO countries, as I pointed out in the last Nygaard Notes, and not only the Pentagon but also the CIA routinely seek to influence public opinion in those countries. The CIA's plan is to "tap into the key concerns of specific Western European audiences," focusing "on a message that [the occupation of Afghanistan] benefits Afghan civilians." Key concerns differ by country, says the CIA, so they may have to come up with different "tailored messages," such as one that "could tap into acute French concern for civilians and refugees." So we can expect to see the CIA and/or the Pentagon placing stories into the French media about how hard we try to kill only the right people, and how sorry we are when we kill the wrong people (e.g, this February 17 NY Times headline: "Marines Join in Sorrow After Afghan Casualties"). The narrative: The occupation is being carried out by good people, just trying to help, but who sometimes make mistakes.

Convincing the Victims: The Afghan Audience

While "company-level leaders apply the narrative gradually" to the Afghan people within their specific theaters of operation, there is a wider audience, inside of Afghanistan and in the larger non-allied world, that also needs to be targeted.

A little-reported meeting concerning Afghanistan's fate was held in London back in January. High-ranking representatives of 70 nations attended the Conference—including Afghan President Hamid Karzai—and they together issued a "communiqué" that summed up the narrative intended for the Afghan audience. It spoke of a "mutual commitment" by the Afghan government and "the international community... towards helping Afghanistan emerge as a secure, prosperous, and democratic nation." And the "international community re-affirmed its support" for "upholding the security, stability and prosperity of Afghanistan." This is the message that is promoted in Afghanistan by Pentagon propagandists—and that forms the unspoken basis for many of the news stories about the occupation that we see. The London Guardian, in an August 28th 2009 article, stated the message about as simply as it can be stated, casually referring to "the U.S. message that U.S. action will ultimately improve the lives of Afghan citizens."

The Army's Field Manual explains how "the U.S. message" will get to people in Afghanistan (and beyond), saying,

"Command themes and messages based on policy should be distributed simultaneously or as soon as possible using all available media. Radio, television, newspapers, flyers, billboards, and the Internet are all useful dissemination means. Polling and analysis should be conducted to determine which media allow the widest dissemination of themes to the desired audiences at the local, regional, national, and international levels."

Exactly how the U.S. military arranges to "use...all available media" is not addressed in this declassified document, nor should we expect it to be addressed. The Associated Press last year cited Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, director of strategic communications for the U.S. Central Command, who reminds us that "psychological operations must be secret to be effective."

The "available media" used by the Pentagon is increasingly global and interdependent, blurring whatever lines may have existed in the past between foreign and domestic audiences. The same Gregory Smith, according to the AP, "says that in the 21st century, it is probably not possible to win the information battle with insurgents without exposing American citizens to secret U.S. propaganda." That's a problem, since it is technically illegal to propagandize the U.S. public.

And so it is that consumers of the U.S. media see a constant stream of articles that discuss how the U.S. promotes things like "development" and "civilian capacity-building" and "a more responsible government" in Afghanistan. It will be a rare news source that will discuss other possible reasons for U.S. behavior in Afghanistan, reasons that, if widely known, would fatally erode what little political support remains for the occupation.

"The Morality of it Has to Be Explained Better"

In the last issue of Nygaard Notes I recounted the bogus reporting that no doubt has left a good number of USAmericans with the distinct impression that the recent military offensive in Marja, Afghanistan, was a "success." I predicted that we would see similar reports of "success" when the next big offensive, in Kandahar, Afghanistan, gets underway in a few weeks. I'm not ready to say that I was wrong, but a number of recent reports may indicate that the difficulties facing the U.S. occupation are greater than I thought. Here's a quick look at some recent developments.

Marja: "Still Waiting to See the Outcome"

The Pentagon released a statement on May 6th saying "Ongoing operations in Marja, Afghanistan, are proving the Obama administration is on the right track in that country, Defense and State Department officials said today." And a headline in the Los Angeles Times said "U.S. Calls Offensive in Marja a Success." While these recent reports echo the optimistic media reports that came out during and immediately after the February Marja offensive, a contrary version of events has now begun to surface in the corporate media.

An April 26th New York Times story reported "Two months after the Marja offensive, Afghan officials acknowledge that the Taliban have in some ways retaken the momentum there... ‘We are still waiting to see the outcome in Marja,' said Shaida Abdali, the deputy Afghan national security adviser. ‘If you are planning for operations in Kandahar, you must show success in Marja. You have to be able to point to something. Now you don't have a good example to point to there.'"

Two weeks later, on May 9th, a Washington Post editorial noted that "the senior military official [in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal] cautions that 90 days after the offensive, ‘Marja is a mixed bag,' with parts of the area still controlled by the Taliban and Afghan government performance spotty. A top State Department official agrees: ‘Transfer is not happening' in Marja."

A more general assessment appeared in the LA Times on April 29th: "A Pentagon report presented a sobering new assessment Wednesday [April 28] of the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan, saying that its abilities are expanding and its operations are increasing in sophistication, despite recent major offensives by U.S. forces in the militants' heartland... The report . . . portrays an insurgency with deep roots and broad reach..."

Finally, just last week (May 17th) the NY Times reported that "Combat operations in Marja ended at the end of February and the military declared the battle won. But much of the local Taliban, including at least four mid-level commanders, never left, stashing their rifles and adopting the quiet farm life." Added the Times, "Taliban fighters have found a way to resume their insurgency, three months after thousands of troops invaded" Marja. All of this is perfectly consistent with expected outcomes in a guerrilla campaign—as reported in these pages.

Doubts About Kandahar

The Marja offensive is "the largest American-led military operation in Afghanistan" so far. The next big NATO offensive, the one in Kandahar, "is expected to be the make-or-break offensive of the nearly 9-year-old war," and was scheduled to begin in June. But as the shine on the Marja offensive fades, it begins to look less and less likely that the Pentagon will be able to produce a "success" in Kandahar despite their impressive propaganda budget. Even the U.S. media is beginning to express some doubts.

For instance, the McClatchy News Service (now called McClatchy-Tribune Information Services, or MCT) began a May 14th article with these words:

"Although it is just beginning, the U.S.-led effort to pacify the Taliban's spiritual capital [in Kandahar] already appears to be faltering. Key military operations have been delayed until the fall, efforts to improve local government are having little effect and a Taliban assassination campaign has brought a sense of dread to Kandahar's dusty streets."

That sense of dread is not due only to the Taliban, apparently. The Canadian press reports that people living in Kandahar "are living in fear of a forthcoming NATO offensive planned for Kandahar and its outskirts this summer."

Apparently the prospect of another major offensive by NATO and its Afghan partners is sufficiently unpopular that the U.S. has decided it might be best not to talk about it. Or, if we must talk about it, let's talk about how it will be different than the other offensives. When Afghan president Hamid Karzai was in Washington for four days earlier this month, he and the Obama administration "went to some lengths to depict a looming coalition offensive around Kandahar as not a full-fledged military assault." Those words are from a The New York Times story about the Karzai visit headlined: "Karzai and Clinton Put Different Face on Afghan Drive."

Gen. McChrystal, for example, told reporters in a May 13 press conference that "We're not using the term operation or major operations [in relation to Kandahar], because that often brings to mind in people's psyche the idea of a D-Day and an H-hour and an attack. To which a well-trained reporter—don't know her name—responded "You're not using the word ‘operation,' because I know the Afghans are very sensitive about that word."

(I say "well-trained" because the idea that Afghans are "sensitive" to "that word" is entirely consistent with the "U.S. message" that we are the Good Guys and any problems the Afghans have with the occupation must be the result of us not explaining ourselves well. A journalist who entertained an alternative explanation—that Afghans are "sensitive" not about words, but about dying at the hands of an occupying army—would likely be judged unfit to question the General.)

On the same day that McChrystal spoke, President Karzai told reporters that "the effort in Kandahar and the surrounding area has to be explained better, and the morality of it has to be explained better. So we are not calling it an operation."

Some media apparently didn't get the memo. It was the very next day, May 14th, that Radio Free Europe reported that "The U.S.-led campaign to root out terrorist pockets in the southern city of Kandahar is expected to begin in June and last through August." And five days after that (May 19) the NY Times told the world that "Afghan leaders and NATO commanders are preparing to launch a major offensive in the southern city of Kandahar."

I've been predicting that the upcoming whatever-we're-supposed-to-call-it in Kandahar would be reported as a "success," much like the February offensive in Marja, Afghanistan was reported as a success. Now, since the illusion of success in Marja is breaking down, it appears as though the U.S. has decided to either hold off on the Kandahar non-operation, or else to just try not to talk about it. Since virtually all of the reporters who are actually in Afghanistan are "embedded" with U.S. troops, and hopelessly dependent on official sources, it may just be possible to carry out a "make-or-break" offensive on the sly. We'll see.

This week's "Quote" of the Week cites a recent U.S. Army survey which indicates that a whopping 94 percent of the people of Kandahar believe that it is better to negotiate with the Taliban than to continue fighting. The U.S. response appears to be to not only continue, but to escalate, the fighting, and to call it something else.

A huge budget for propaganda aimed at "obtaining local, regional, and international support" for the occupation means that every attempt will be made by the U.S. to put a positive spin on the behavior of the occupation forces, in Kandahar and elsewhere. Consistent with the pattern, the news that a milestone was reached on May 18th, when the number of USAmericans killed in Afghanistan reached 1,000, merited not a single front-page story in this country. And, more tellingly, the number of innocent Afghans who have been killed as a result of the U.S. occupation remains largely unreported on any page, and thus largely unknown, in this country.