This Week: Update on the Secret Air Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

"Quote" of the Week

The Secret Air Wars Continue: 2008 Update

Why Do They Hate Us? Read the Last Paragraph

Violence in Iraq: Understanding Cause and Effect

 

Greetings,

I'm sorry to say that this is the third annual report on what I call the "secret" air wars being conducted by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secret, as I've said, not because it can't be known, but because it is not talked about nor reported to the people in the U.S. That is, it is secret in practice, if not in literal fact. The effect is the same: People will not resist something of which they are ignorant, no matter how grossly it violates their values.

I say that I'm sorry that this is the third annual report. I'm sorry for so many reasons. First of all, none of this should have happened in the first place. Secondly, it shouldn't be a secret. Thirdly,
I'm sorry that I'm one of the very few people in the United States writing and talking about this. And, fourthly (fourthly?) I am sorry that such reporting seems increasingly difficult for the big media—who, after all, have the resources to do a far better job of this than I am able to do from my office in Minneapolis—to even attempt.

In a future Nygaard Notes I will report on The State of the News Media 2008, which gives some hints as to why the big media outlets are increasingly failing to do their job.

For now, my hope is that this week's issue (with more on the subject next week) will prompt some readers of Nygaard Notes to ask your local media people—and any candidates for political office who happen to pass through your town—why they are not speaking about these daily incidents of aerial destruction and wanton killing, and what they plan to do to help move them to the front pages.

Yours in peace,

Nygaard

"Quote" of the Week:

From "Looking Up: Normalizing Air War from Guernica to Arab Jabour," by Tom Engelhardt on the TomDispatch website:

"In Iraq and Afghanistan, when it comes to the mainstream media, bombing is generally only significant if it's of the roadside or suicide variety; if, that is, the ‘bombs' can be produced at approximately ‘the cost of a pizza' (as Improvised Explosive Devicess sometimes are), or if the vehicles delivering them are cars or simply fiendishly well-rigged human bodies. From the air, even 100,000 pounds of bombs just doesn't have the ring of something that matters... The air war is simply not visible to most Americans who depend on the mainstream media. In part, this is because American reporters, who have covered every other sort of warfare in Iraq, simply refuse to look up."

The Secret Air Wars Continue: 2008 Update

This is Nygaard Notes' third annual report on what I call the "secret" U.S. air wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Back in March of 2007, about thirteen months ago, I reported that, at that time, "according to the Air Force's own numbers, the U.S. is conducting an average of 93 airstrikes per day" in Iraq and Afghanistan. ("The Secret Air Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan," NN # 366). Now, despite the claims of "reduced violence" in Iraq, the numbers of airstrikes appear to be even higher. According to numbers released by the U.S. Air Force, the number of daily airstrikes conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan during the last two weeks of March 2008 (the dates were randomly chosen) ranged from a low of 69 to a high of 115, with the average number of airstrikes being a little more than 97. Every day. 57 per day in Iraq, on average. 40 in Afghanistan.

Not all of these strikes involve the actual dropping of bombs. But, remember, this number, 97, is only the number officially reported by the Air Force. I have to repeat what I quoted Nick Turse as saying last year: That number "does not include guided missiles and unguided rockets fired, or cannon rounds expended; nor, according to an [Air Force] spokesman, does it take into account the munitions used by some Marine Corps and other coalition aircraft or any of the Army's helicopter gunships. Moreover, it does not include munitions used by the armed helicopters of the many private security contractors flying their own missions in Iraq."

Nor, I must now add, does it include what are known in military circles as "UAVs," or "unmanned aerial vehicles." (I'll have more on these remote-control killers in the next Nygaard Notes.)

"They Deserve to Die"

Back in April of 2007 Air Force Chief of Staff T. Michael Moseley was asked "What's more effective in the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan: air power or boots on the ground?". According to a report by DefenseTech.org, Moseley "said that his staff had told him that ‘it looks like the air component is killing bad guys at a higher rate than anyone else…' I have anecdotal evidence from the staff that says airpower is the most lethal of the components in wrapping up bad guys... As far as numbers of people killed, as far as wrapping up bad guys and as far as delivering a kinetic effect the air component—which also includes Marine and Navy air, by the way—is the most lethal of the components. I have not seen those numbers … but I thought that was a useful observation…"

Useful, indeed. Someone please tell the U.S. media.

Moseley is typical in acknowledging only the deaths of "bad guys." The April 8th, 2008 edition of the L.A. Times reported that "A U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad, Lt. Col. Steven Stover, rejected Iraqi allegations that U.S. airstrikes and gunfire have killed mainly civilians. ‘There might be some civilians that are getting caught, but for the most part, we're killing the bad guys. We're very precise,' he said."

A week earlier, on March 29th, the Washington Post reported that "the military had killed 78 ‘bad guys' in the past three days." They then quoted the same Colonel Stover offering the official line as follows: "They are violating the rule of law. They are firing rockets indiscriminately. They are criminals and terrorists, and they deserve to die."

So, here's what we are supposed to believe: Because "we're very precise" we kill only "bad guys" who "deserve to die." (Well, "there might be some civilians," but who's counting?)

Yet the Washington Post on February 13 quoted former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Marc Garlasco, speaking of U.S. airstrikes: "Even when you hit the right target, there are times when innocents pay the price..." So, maybe "we" are not as precise as some claim. However accurate our airstrikes may or may not be, even a reading of the corporate media reveals that it's not always the "bad guys" who are being killed. Have a look at the following items, all from the corporate press, all within the past couple of months:

The Knight Ridder News Service, on March 26, said that "U.S. airstrikes were directed against targets in Mahdi Army-controlled neighborhoods in Hilla, south of Baghdad. Muthanna Ahmed, the Babil police spokesman, said the strikes killed and wounded some 60 people, while the U.S. military said four people that lead ‘special groups' of Shiite militants in the city were killed." So, were four "bad guys" killed? Or was it 60 "people," maybe some "good guys?" We don't know.

Reporting the "Facts" on Civilian Deaths

The Washington Post reported on March 28th that an anonymous "adviser to Iraqi security forces" said that "So far, casualties in Basra on all sides have totaled about 400 killed and 300 wounded."

But the McClatchy papers reported on the same day that "At least 231 people, including some gunmen and security officers, have been killed and hundreds injured so far in the clashes in Basra, neighboring provinces and Baghdad."

Two days later, March 30th, the L.A. Times had it like this: "U.S. warplanes conducted more airstrikes in Basra, where Maliki launched a military offensive against militia fighters Tuesday. Police and hospital reports have indicated that more than 100 people have been killed there."

The next day, March 31, the Seattle Times reported, "So far, 488 people have been killed and more than 900 wounded in the offensive, Iraqi officials said."

So, how many were killed during this one-week period? 100? 231? 400? 488? Good guys? Bad guys? In Basra only? In "neighboring provinces?" In Baghdad? Where are these "facts" coming from?

"We" Say, But "They" Say...

Here's the Associated Press, in a March 29th story: "Before dawn yesterday, a U.S. aircraft fired a Hellfire missile in the Sadr City district... The U.S. military said the missile strike killed four militants, but Iraqi officials said nine civilians were killed and nine others wounded."

So, who was killed? Militants? Or civilians? How about "militant civilians"? Is being "militant" worthy of a death sentence?

Here's the Associated Press two days later, on March 31: "A U.S. airstrike killed 25 suspected militants after American ground forces came under heavy fire during a combat patrol in predominantly Shi'a eastern Baghdad, where the fiercest clashes in the capital have occurred." Is being "suspected" of being a "militant" worthy of a death sentence? For the U.S. military apparently it is.

And, from the Los Angeles Times of March 30: "On Thursday night, a Navy jet unleashed 20-millimeter cannon fire on what U.S. and British authorities said was a mortar-launching position. The United States said three militiamen were killed. Some Basra residents said eight civilians, including five members of one family, were among the dead. The U.S. military said it was aware of the report but could not confirm it. ‘I can say that coalition forces make every effort to engage only hostile threats,' a military spokeswoman said in an e-mail response to questions about the incident."

Here's the LA Times again, on March 31: "In Baghdad... The military said it had killed 25 ‘armed criminals' in an airstrike after a patrol was ambushed in east Baghdad with roadside bombs, rocket-propelled grenades, small arms and indirect fire, a military term for rockets or mortar rounds. It was one of at least six airstrikes in Shiite-dominated parts of the capital Sunday that killed about 50 combatants, according to Maj. Mark Cheadle, a U.S. military spokesman." Were they really "combatants?" There were no other sources cited here.

The media will never say it this way, but when you read these sorts of reports day after day after day, here's what it sounds like: There is a massive aerial bombardment of Iraq (and, although I didn't focus on it here, Afghanistan) underway, one that is killing large numbers of people, some unknown number of whom are clearly innocent. And no one from the country that is responsible for this violence is making any serious attempt to discover the degree and nature of this violence and make it known to the people in the best position to stop it: the people of the United States.

Why Do They Hate Us? Read the Last Paragraph

Bombings occur all the time in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Some bombings get reported prominently in this country and some don't. Some bombings are considered headline-worthy, while some are relegated to a sentence or paragraph here or there, often at the very ends of stories about something else. There is a pattern to these decisions about which bombings are newsworthy and which are not and, not surprisingly, the decisions almost always conform to the propaganda needs of U.S. warmakers.

Some recent headlines about bombings include this one from the Seattle Times: "8 U.S. Troops among Dozens Killed in Insurgent Bombings." And this, from the Chicago Tribune: "At Least 53 Die in Baghdad Bombings." And this, from the Chattanooga Times Free Press: "Bombing Kills 23 in Iraq." Occasionally, the headline will mention civilians, as this New York Times head from April 11: "Car Bomb in Afghanistan Kills as Many as Eight Civilians."

All of these headlines refer to bombs placed by "bad guys," and just in case that wasn't clear, the Times found an Afghani police chief to underline the point by saying, "This is the work of the enemy of the country." And, while there are many Afghanis who might think that "the enemy of the country" is the United States, any evidence to support that idea—such as details about the innocents killed by the U.S. air war—never makes the headlines. Such evidence, if it appears at all, follows the pattern that is illustrated by the following examples:

The headline of a NY Times story from April 11 (not the one mentioned above) read, "Making Perfunctory Preparations for Combat in Anti-American Cleric's Stronghold." The final paragraph went like this: "The American military in Baghdad said it killed 13 people suspected of being ‘criminals' around the capital on Wednesday, including four killed in an airstrike after they attacked soldiers erecting concrete barriers in northeast Baghdad, the district around Sadr City, and one who opened fire from a rooftop at a joint Iraqi and American checkpoint nearby."

The front-page headline in the March 31st Times was "Cleric Suspends Battle in Basra By Shiite Militia." Here are the last three paragraphs of that story: "An aircraft called in to support [U.S.] soldiers killed 25 people, according to [a statement released by the U.S. military]...

"American forces also conducted airstrikes in the New Baghdad neighborhood, just south of Sadr City, in Kadhimiya, in Ghazaliya in eastern Baghdad and in the northern part of the city, according to the American military. At least 21 people were killed.

"An official at the Interior Ministry... said that 150 civilians had been killed and 350 wounded in the violence that has erupted in Baghdad over the past five days."

Here's the NY Times again (and remember, every Times story appears in many smaller newspapers around the country), this time from April 9. The headline was, "Shiite Cleric Cancels Big Baghdad Protest as Fighting Persists in Sadr City," and the final paragraph read, "The United States military said one soldier was killed Tuesday in Baghdad by a bomb that struck his vehicle in northeast Baghdad, where American forces have been fighting the Sadrists. It also said three airstrikes had hit mortar-launching sites in the same area, killing 12 suspected fighters."

An "Update" was published on the last page of my local paper on April 2nd that said "The new top official in Pakistan's terrorism-racked northwest frontier has demanded that the United States end missile strikes in the country and called for negotiations with militants—an approach that would dramatically alter the American-inspired war on terror there." (Those words didn't appear in the last paragraph, but the whole Update was only three paragraphs long.)

Why Do They Hate Us?

A Lexis/Nexis database search of U.S. newspapers for the month ending April 12th looking for the words "airstrike" and "civilians" in the lead paragraphs turns up 20 wire service stories, but only two newspaper reports. One was an 82-word brief on page 5 of the Grand Rapids Press in Michigan. The other was a 700-word report on page 4 of the Newark Star Ledger. When I searched for "air war" instead of "airstrike" I found only references to past "air wars"—from Kosovo to "Desert Storm" to World War II. I couldn't find a mention of the current ones in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Edited out of the Pakistan "Update" that I mentioned earlier, but appearing in the original McClatchy News story, were these words: "The region [in Pakistan]... has seen a sharp escalation in U.S. missile attacks from Afghanistan on suspected Islamic militants. [The leader of the northwest frontier province] insisted that this tactic must end, saying ‘There is a general hatred in [the province] against certain policies, especially against these strikes. We will consider it as an open violation, interfering in internal affairs."

Understanding the scale and nature of such "violations" might help people in the U.S. to understand why such "general hatred" may eventually extend beyond "certain policies" to include a hatred of the perpetrators and the people who vote for them. This, in turn, may be expected to contribute to future "terrorism." These are things the U.S. public would do well to ponder.

The "last paragraph" phenomenon can be explained by a lot of factors, one of which is a propaganda effort that has resulted in a general misunderstanding about the causes of "violence" in Iraq and Afghanistan. The next piece discusses that misunderstanding.

Violence in Iraq: Understanding Cause and Effect

A good theory is one that is explanatory and predictive. That is, if a theory can adequately explain what is currently happening and can also predict future events, then it is a good theory. If it cannot do those things, then it is not such a good theory. I have formulated two contrasting theories about violence in Iraq, and what they explain and predict. Here they are:

Theory #1: The U.S. occupation is a peaceful and just response to violence. This explains violence in Iraq as primarily an Iraqi-on-Iraqi phenomenon, and predicts that more intervention by the U.S.—higher troop levels, more airstrikes, better killing technology, etc—will reduce violence.

Theory #2: The U.S. occupation of Iraq is a violent and unjust violation of the Iraqi people's rights and Iraq's national sovereignty. This explains violence in Iraq as largely a response to and a consequence of the U.S. occupation, and includes under the term "violence" the violence perpetrated by U.S. occupation forces. Theory #2 predicts that high levels of violence will continue as long as the occupation continues, and that the violence will increase in response to any escalations ("surges") that may be decided in Washington.

(Before going any further, let me address the obvious question: Has there not been a reduction in "violence" in Iraq as a result of the "surge" in U.S. troops over the past year? While there has been an apparent reduction in "violence" since September 2007, this is more likely to be due to developments within Iraqi society than to the U.S. escalation. The unilateral ceasefire called by Muqtada al-Sadr is perhaps the most significant development, but there are others. It's impossible to know for certain, but it could even be that the reduction in violence has occurred in spite of, and not because of, the U.S. escalation.)

Of the two theories outlined above, I think Theory #2 is the better one, but Theory #1 is the one preferred by the architects and supporters of the occupation. And, while Theory #1 may or may not be preferred by members of the news media, it is nonetheless reinforced in the media on a regular basis. This is because of the nature of reporting from and about Iraq, which consists of routinely repeating the claims and reports of the architects and supporters of the occupation, and generally ignoring any sources that might challenge the propaganda that is offered by the preferred sources.

"U.S. Troops Make Peace, Not War"

One of the most famous quotations from George Orwell's "1984" is the slogan of The Party: "War is Peace; Freedom is Slavery; Ignorance is Strength." It would be hard to get closer to the first part of that slogan than this (actual) headline from the Houston Chronicle of April 6, in a story about Iraq: "U.S. Troops Make Peace, Not War." Such Orwellian statements of Theory #1 are rather rare, but the media is full of other, less overtly Orwellian, reinforcements of the theory. Consider this paragraph from the New York Times of March 27:

"[I]f the Mahdi Army breaks completely with the cease-fire that has helped to tamp down attacks in Iraq during the past year, there is a risk of replaying 2004, when the militia fought intense battles with American forces that destabilized the entire country and ushered in years of escalating violence. Renewed attacks, in turn, would make it more difficult to begin sending home large numbers of American troops."

That's Theory #1 speaking. Note that it was the "militia fighting" that "ushered in years of escalating violence." Theory #2, which sees much of the violence in Iraq as a response to and a consequence of the U.S. occupation, would say that "sending home large numbers of American troops" would be expected to reduce the likelihood of "renewed attacks."

Another example appeared the very next day, March 28th, in the Times, in a front-page story. The Times said, "Should the [Mahdi army's] cease-fire collapse entirely, those gains could be in serious jeopardy, making it far more difficult to begin bringing substantial numbers of American troops home."

There's Theory #1 again. Theory #2 would reverse the order and say that "bringing substantial numbers of American troops home" would guard against a collapse of the cease-fire. How the choice to escalate or de-escalate is seen depends on the reporter's belief in Theory #1 or Theory #2.

Another agenda-setting media outlet, the Washington Post, is also doing its part to reinforce this particular piece of propaganda. In the March 28th edition, we read that "In August, [Shiite cleric Muqtada al-] Sadr ordered his militia to observe a cease-fire, a move widely credited with helping to reduce violence across Iraq. ... Further fighting with his men could slow U.S. troop withdrawals from Iraq." Try turning that last sentence around, and we could read, "Slowing U.S. troop withdrawals from Iraq could provoke further fighting..."

What is at stake here is the basic understanding of cause and effect in regard to the disaster underway in Iraq. If Theory #1—that the U.S. occupation is a peaceful and just response to violence—is correct, then it makes sense that more occupation will "reduce the horrific violence." However, if Theory #2—that the U.S. occupation of Iraq is violent and unjust—is correct, then sending more troops can be expected to increase the overall level of violence.

Which theory makes more sense to you has to do with a whole set of beliefs about the world. If you believe that violence is caused by "evil people" simply because they are evil, then you will likely believe that nothing can be done to reduce violence other than to "destroy" or "eliminate" those evil people. But if you don't believe that, then you'll have to look for other ways to reduce violence. Many people are doing so, although one wouldn't know it from reading the corporate media.

Simply ending the U.S. occupation of Iraq will not stop the "violence" there. It's not as simple as that, especially since the structure of Iraqi society has been ruptured so badly by five years of occupation preceded by 12 years of criminal sanctions. But as long as the United States maintains a huge military force in the region and gives every indication that it will do whatever is necessary to protect "American interests" there, the violence will continue, and will likely spread. That's what Theory #2 tells us, and I think it's a pretty good theory.

Next week: More on the secret air wars.