| Number 391 | November 9, 2007 |
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Greetings, Last week I promised to spend a couple of weeks strolling through the news of the past few months, catching up and pointing out the weirdest of the weird, the absurdest of the absurd, and the revealingest of the revealing. As it turns out, I discovered that my clippings fell into categories, the largest of which was Wartime Propaganda. So, this week's edition is the first of two consecutive issues that focus on Propaganda Frameworks as they apply to the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the ongoing whatever-it-is in Afghanistan. I hesitate to call either of them "wars," as I don't think either situation, although certainly violent and military in nature, are really "wars." This week's issue is sort of one big article, divided into six parts. I often speak of two levels of Propaganda: Overt Propaganda and Deep Propaganda. Overt Propaganda is the thing we are supposed to believe. Deep Propaganda is the thing that makes the Overt Propaganda believable. This week I use Stuart Hall's term—"frameworks"—to talk about the same idea. It's not complicated; it's just sneaky. As I looked at the newspapers I had collected, I thought there were some obvious examples of Wartime Propaganda Frameworks jumping out at me. Then I realized that it may not be so obvious to everyone. By giving numerous examples of things I recognize, my hope is that all who read this humble newsletter will become a little more capable of seeing them for yourselves. And teaching your friends how to do it, as well. So, off we go with two weeks of Wartime Propaganda, then a week or two of miscellaneous catching up. After that, it's anyone's guess! See you next week, Nygaard |
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"[A] Turkish advance into northern Iraq would instantly bring fresh troubles to a country where the United States is preoccupied with trying to manage a civil war." This comment appeared in a front-page article about tensions between Turkey and Iraq in regard to Kurdish rebels. This offhand comment appeared in the fourth paragraph, and has a particular power as propaganda, as it is stated as a "given." That is, the reporter does not appear to think that the idea that the U.S. is "managing a civil war" needs to be supported by any argument, any evidence, any citations from authoritative figures, or anything else. Stating the point as secondary to the main point is the equivalent of saying, "Of course..." It assumes that the listener is "with" the speaker, and the point about to be made is safe to use as a foundation for the argument that follows. No need to support the point; everyone "knows" it, of course. Back in Nygaard Notes #314 I quoted the British social theorist Stuart Hall, who said "When people say to you, ‘Of course that's so, isn't it?' that ‘of course' is the most ideological moment, because that's the moment at which you're least aware that you are using a particular framework, and that if you used another framework the things that you are talking about would have a different meaning." While the user of a particular framework may be unaware that they are using it, that doesn't mean that nobody is aware of it. When such frameworks are consciously promoted and reinforced, it can be called Propaganda. The Propaganda framework that is here used unconsciously is the idea that the U.S. is "managing" something called a "civil war." Another, different, framework would be that the U.S. is engaged in an illegal and illegitimate occupation of a sovereign country, and is consequently dealing with the indigenous resistance that inevitably goes with such an occupation. As Hall says, if one were to use that framework, "the things that you are talking about would have a different meaning." The avoidance of this alternative framework is why many powerful people have put much energy into reinforcing the preferred "civil war" framework. And they've done it so consistently that the corporate media types who have come to rely almost exclusively on powerful, official sources for their reports have—for the most part—come to accept this framework without question. Which results in offhand comments like this one on the nation's front pages, with all the propagandistic power that they have. |
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On October 18th my local newspaper the Star Tribune ran a photo on Page 3 of a group of Iraqi women and children, with an out-of-focus U.S. soldier carrying a machine gun in the foreground. Here's the somewhat lengthy caption, in its entirety: "A HELPING HAND FOR CIVILIANS: A U.S. soldier stood guard as residents of Hillah, about 60 miles south of Baghdad, waited for humanitarian aid to be distributed by U.S. and Iraqi troops on Wednesday. Attending to the wider problems for civilians caused by the dislocations of war is one of the U.S. Army's principal concerns." That's the entire caption. The U.S. Army's job, it could be argued, is to CAUSE the "dislocations of war." That is, after all, what armies do. But the Propaganda framework here is different. The preferred framework in this case is the idea that it is legitimate for the U.S. Army to have the distribution of "humanitarian aid" as one of its "principal concerns." That's a very controversial idea, however, and the following quotation from a 2003 opinion piece in the Christian Science Monitor explains why: "Under a military-controlled relief effort, humanitarian assistance can easily become a tool of war. Hostile forces might see aid workers as easy targets and allies of the occupying force. Moreover, the neediest Iraqis may never receive assistance if their needs don't match the Pentagon's political goals. The reconstruction effort is likely to lack international legitimacy and financial support." |
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Propaganda Framework III: We're Not Responsible for Our Killing |
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The lead paragraph from an October 13th story in the New York Times reads as follows: "The American military said on Friday that it was vigorously investigating a Thursday evening airstrike on a stronghold of insurgent leaders northwest of Baghdad that also killed nine children and six women. The civilian toll is one of the highest to result from a single American military action since the beginning of the Iraq war." One of the highest? What the Times meant to say, I'm sure, is that this is "one of the highest" civilian tolls that the media has reported as such. For instance, Dahr Jamail reports that an Iraqi human rights group "estimated that between 4,000 and 6,000 Iraqi civilians were killed during the November 2004 U.S. assault on Fallujah." (See "Fallujah: A Media Case Study," in NN #277, November 12, 2004.) It's difficult to believe that there weren't more than a couple "single American military actions" among the 4,000 to 6,000 that amounted to more than 15 civilians. And it is almost certainly the case that there have been numerous other massacres over the past four years, many far larger than the Baghdad incident reported here, that have yet to penetrate into the living rooms of the average United States news "consumer." For the Times to report this massacre as exceptional has the effect of reinforcing the Propaganda framework put forth by the U.S. military, and stated by Rear Admiral Greg Smith in the third paragraph of this report, that "We do not target civilians." The Propaganda framework is further reinforced by the headline on this article (which quoted only military and government officials): "U.S. Investigates Civilian Toll in Airstrike, but Holds Insurgents Responsible." Here, then, is the sequence of events as reported by the Times in this article: 1. "Insurgents first fired on a unit of American soldiers approaching
a residential structure." (How do we know they were "insurgents"?
No evidence offered.) But it wasn't just an enemy building, apparently. As the Times points out, "It was not clear ... whether American commanders knew that so many civilians were in or near the structure when they authorized the airstrike." One way to make an unconscious framework conscious is to re-tell the story, using references that are more familiar. So, in this case, let's imagine that a murder is committed on a busy street. Then imagine that a man begins to run away into a crowd of people. Now, imagine that nearby police pull out machine guns and shoot him. Finally, although the police don't "target" any innocent people, 15 innocent people are killed in the process of "neutralizing" the suspect. Now, if you can, try to imagine a headline on this imaginary scenario that resembles the one on the Times article: "District Attorney's Office Investigates Death Toll in Fleeing Murderer Shooting Case, Holds Murderer Responsible."
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One of the most prevalent Propaganda frameworks allowed into the public discussion to explain the increasing rejection of the U.S. occupation of Iraq is the idea that the U.S. invasion and occupation of that country was and is "a mistake" that is being managed incompetently. The alternative, unthinkable, framework is that it was and is a premeditated and deliberate crime. It could be both—that is, an incompetently-managed crime—but within the propaganda system only one interpretation can be allowed into mainstream discussion. So it was no surprise when the October 13th New York Times gave front-page treatment to some comments by retired Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez, a former "top commander of American forces" in Iraq. Sanchez, according to the Times, "called the Bush administration's handling of the war ‘incompetent' and said the result was ‘a nightmare with no end in sight.'" And so on and so forth, in what the Times described as a "sweeping indictment" and "an unusually broad attack on the overall course of the war." Readers may recall that Sanchez, as the Times says, "retired in 2006 after being replaced in Iraq after the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal." The Times goes on to say that "Though he was cleared of wrongdoing in the abuses after an inquiry by the Army's inspector general, General Sanchez became a symbol—with civilian officials like L. Paul Bremer III, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority—of ineffective American leadership early in the occupation." A symbol, indeed, but the idea that he may be a symbol of something beyond "ineffective leadership" is unspeakable—likely unthinkable—in the corporate media. In fact, the Times tells us that Mr. Sanchez is "now a Pentagon consultant who trains active-duty generals." Mr. Sanchez appears to think that the main thing missing from U.S. policy is "a strategy that will achieve victory in that war-torn country or in the greater conflict against extremism." That's what he said at a gathering of military reporters and editors, according to the Times. The alternative framework that cannot be discussed is the idea that the "extremists" might be the very forces that General Sanchez once commanded. The "different meaning" given to the story by this framework would say that a U.S. "victory," rather than being a victory against "extremism," might actually be a victory for "extremism." It's pretty "extreme," after all, to pursue strategic dominance in the region, as the U.S. is doing, by an unwarranted invasion and occupation, at the cost of perhaps a million lives (and counting). Who are the "good guys" and who are the "bad guys" in Iraq? It's clear how the Times answers the question. And as long as the Times, and the corporate media of which it is a leader, relies almost entirely on official sources on one side of the conflict, it looks like the "nightmare with no end in sight" is the limiting of our public discussion to issues of "competence" as this war continues and we prepare for more to come. |
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On September 18, 2006—more than a year ago—NATO forces in Afghanistan were completing something called "Operation Medusa," which was "the alliance's two-week offensive to push Taliban remnants from southern Afghanistan and pave the way for reconstruction and development. The effort, said NATO at the time "has proven to be a "significant success" and has "sent a message to enemy forces..." Skip ahead 14 months to October 2nd, 2007, where we find the following headline in my local paper, the Star Tribune: "2007 Afghanistan's Most Violent Year Since Invasion." That McClatchy News Service story ran on Page 4. Meanwhile, on the same day, in the same paper, but this time on Page One, ran this headline: "U.S., Iraqi Deaths Decline Sharply. Civilian Fatalities Were Down the Most Last Month; The U.S. Military Partly Credited the Troop Surge." The source of the front-page article, the Washington Post, obediently reported that "U.S. military officials expressed optimism Monday about the declining death tolls..." Sounds like U.S. forces are, once again, sending a "message," but it's not to "enemy forces," who get their "messages" from other sources. The "message" is the idea that "we" are "winning," the message is being sent via the media—to the only people who can stop this occupation: U.S. taxpayers. |
